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Notes
Peasants’ Revolt: Why Congress Should
Eliminate the Tax Benefits on
Dead Peasant Insurance
Patrick Burns
Corporate-owned life insurance (“COLI”) is a form of insurance in which an employer
takes out a life insurance policy on the life of one of its employees. COLI is legal under
state insurable interest statutes because employers have a financial incentive in the
continuation of certain “key employees.” However, in the past two decades, use of COLI
has increased as large corporations have begun to insure larger percentages of their
workers, even low-wage employees. This widespread practice presents many public policy
concerns: corporations profit by reaping the death benefits when an employee dies and
federal tax law permits the corporations to exclude the proceeds from gross income.
Congress attempted to curb COLI by limiting a corporation from insuring certain types
of employees, but corporations continue to insure large percentages of their employees.
This Note argues that Congress should go further in eliminating COLI due to the
dangerous incentives that it provides to employers in the event of an employee’s death. In
the modern employment context, all employees are replaceable and private businesses
should not reap federal tax benefits from the death of its employees. This Note proposes
changes to state insurable interest laws as well as the elimination of federal tax benefits for
corporations.

* Senior Notes Editor, Hastings Law Journal, 2013–14; J.D. Candidate, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, 2014; M.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2009; B.A.,
University of California, Irvine, 2006. I am grateful to everyone who helped edit this Note especially
Professor Leo Martinez, Eugenée Heeter, Jamie Mei Cheng, and all of the editors at HLJ. Thank you
to Erin for all the love and support you have given me throughout law school. Thank you to Mom,
Dad, family, and friends for encouraging me in everything that I do. Special thanks to Paint it Black
for providing excellent background noise while I worked on this Note.
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In 2008, Irma Johnson mistakenly received a check for $1.5 million
from an insurance company following the death of her husband, Daniel
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1

Johnson. The check should have been sent to Wal-Mart, where Dan
2
worked for only a couple months before being fired in 2001. Wal-Mart
had taken out a life insurance policy on Dan in 2001 and held the
3
beneficial interest under the policy until his death. Wal-Mart’s life
insurance policy is an example of a “Dead Peasant” insurance policy,
where an employer takes out a life insurance policy on a rank-and-file
employee in order to receive tax-free death benefits.
Dead Peasant policies represent extreme forms of corporate-owned
life insurance (“COLI”), a practice whereby an employer takes out a life
insurance policy on a key employee who is integral to the company’s
success to protect the employer in the case of the employee’s death. While
some courts have invalidated such policies, modern COLI arrangements
persist as large corporations continue to take out insurance policies on a
large number of their employees. The question is whether these policies
are legitimate protections against loss, or whether they represent a scheme
that is coldly calculated to fill the coffers of private corporations. This Note
argues that COLI should be limited because it rewards employers when
their employees die quickly.
Courts and legislatures have already prohibited Stranger-Owned
Life Insurance (“STOLI”), where an individual gambles on the life of a
stranger. This Note argues that COLI represents a similar gamble and that
legislatures and courts should prohibit it as they have prohibited STOLI
policies. Additionally, although Congress has not restricted COLI, it has
acted by limiting tax advantages that companies enjoy through COLI. This
Note proposes that state and federal laws should go further in restricting
COLI because in the modern employment relationship, employers do
not need to be compensated following the death of an employee, even
so-called “key persons.”
Part I of this Note summarizes the history of the insurable interest
requirement and outlines the differences between STOLI policies,
viatical settlements, COLI, and Dead Peasant policies. Part II identifies
several public policy concerns created by COLI and explains why such
policies are dangerous. Part III summarizes congressional amendments
that are designed to limit tax advantages of COLI and analyzes the
current state of the law. Part IV proposes three possible legal solutions
for preventing the abusive nature of COLI, and ultimately recommends

1. Claire Shipman & Chris Strathmann, Are ‘Dead Peasant’ Life Insurance Policies Fair?, ABC
News
(Oct. 2,
2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/dead-peasant-life-insurance-policies-fair/
story?id=8724327.
2. Id.
3. Id. Filmmaker Michael Moore documented Irma’s shock and subsequent realization that WalMart would be collecting millions of dollars from her husband’s death in Moore’s 2009 film Capitalism:
A Love Story. Id.
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the elimination of all tax benefits to prevent the inherent dangers of such
policies.

I. Historical Background
A. History of the Insurable Interest Requirement
Prior to 1774, English courts permitted life-wagering contracts where
one citizen would gamble on the death of another by taking out a life
4
insurance policy on that person. It did not matter if the purchaser was
5
related to or knew the insured. In 1774, however, the English Parliament
enacted a statute requiring life insurance policies to contain an insurable
interest, or an interest by the purchaser of the life insurance policy in the
6
longevity of the insured. In other words, one who took out the policy
must have had some incentive for the insured to continue living. The
public policy rationale for enacting an insurable interest requirement in
1774 was that permitting a person to gamble on another’s life could
7
induce the gambler to kill the insured. Consequently, there had to be an
incentive for the policyholder to want the insured to live longer to avoid
8
the potential moral hazard.
As the United States adopted English common law, states required
an insurable interest for life insurance policies, either through statutes or
9
common law. Under these statutes and court decisions, factors that could
satisfy the insurable interest included “blood relation” and “love and
10
affection” to the insured. The logic behind these factors was simple: if one
loves or is related by blood to the insured, she would not be induced to kill
11
the insured. Additionally, statutes and common law decisions often
4. Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance: A Critical
Reassessment, 53 Drake L. Rev. 477, 481 (2005).
5. See id. Interestingly, many of the wagering contracts were taken out on a person accused of a
capital crime and the gamble for the purchaser was whether the conviction and punishment would
stand. Id.
6. Id.
7. Eryn Mathews, STOLI on the Rocks: Why States Should Eliminate the Abusive Practice of
Stranger-Owned Life Insurance, 14 Conn. Ins. L.J. 521, 542 (2008). Modern courts also cite prevention
of murder as a rationale for the insurable interest requirement. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Hopkins, 614 A.2d
96, 98 (Md. 1992).
8. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876) (“A man cannot take out
insurance on the life of a total stranger, nor on that of one who is not so connected with him as to
make the continuance of the life a matter of some real interest to him.”).
9. Id. In Schaefer, Justice Bradley summarized how the insurable interest adoption gradually
migrated from England to the United States: “In this country, statutes [requiring an insurable interest]
have been passed in some of the States; but where they have not been, in most cases either the English
statutes have been considered as operative, or the older common law has been followed.” Id.
10. Mathews, supra note 7, at 543.
11. Id. at 542 (noting that the initial intent for the insurable interest requirement was deterring
murder). The rationale assumed that blood relatives and persons bound by love and affection would
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permitted a “substantial economic interest” as a basis for satisfying the
12
insurable interest requirement.
B. STOLI: A Way Around the Insurable Interest Requirement
1. The Origins of STOLI
STOLI transactions occur when an individual takes out a life
insurance policy and transfers the policy to a stranger in exchange for
money. STOLI transactions date back to the enactment of insurable
13
interest statutes in England. A typical STOLI transaction is set up in this
way: An elderly person is offered a sum of money in exchange for taking
out a life insurance policy on her own life and transferring it immediately
14
to an investor, who will fund the premiums. The investor holds the policy
15
and receives the death benefits when the elderly person dies. Because
the elderly person technically took out the policy on herself, the
transaction is a way to evade the insurable interest statute because it
permits the investor to gamble on the person’s life. As a result, American
courts and legislatures began restricting the legality of such policies.
After the gradual state-by-state adoption of the insurable interest
requirement in the United States, the Supreme Court heard the first case
16
involving a STOLI transaction in Warnock v. Davis in 1881. In Warnock,
Henry Crosser took out a $5000 life insurance policy on his own life and
immediately transferred his interest to a group of investors who agreed to
pay the premiums and pay Crosser’s wife a ten percent ($500)
17
commission. The insurer argued that the contract was void for lacking
an insurable interest; even though Crosser had an insurable interest in his
own life, the formation and assignment of the contract was a sham that
18
allowed the investors to obtain an illegal wagering contract. The Court
invalidated the agreement for lack of an insurable interest because it was
19
not transferred in good faith. Essentially, lack of good faith meant that
20
Crosser only agreed to the policy to facilitate the transfer to the investors.
Therefore, good faith became the legal standard by which a transfer of a

not want to kill each other, but it is merely a theory. In reality, many blood relationships, from Cain
and Abel to the pornographers and the Mitchell Brothers, have ended in familial homicide.
12. Id. at 543.
13. Maria Fleisher, Comment, Stranger Originated Life Insurance: Finding a Modern Cure for an
Age-Old Problem, 41 Cumb. L. Rev. 569, 570–71 (2011).
14. Id. at 570.
15. Id.
16. 104 U.S. 775 (1881).
17. Id. at 775.
18. Id. at 778.
19. Id. at 781–83.
20. Id. at 782.
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life insurance contract to a stranger would be legal: if the individual took
out the policy in good faith, any assignment of the policy would be valid. If
the policy was not procured in good faith, it represented an attempt to
evade the insurable interest requirement and the policy would be
invalidated.
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court refined the criteria for a life
insurance contract to satisfy the insurable interest requirement. In
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Schaefer, the Court held that an
21
insurable interest need only exist “at the time of taking out the policy.”
The Court reemphasized that if an insured takes out a policy in good
22
faith, it would be held valid. Therefore, as long as a policy was valid at
its inception and later transferred, it satisfied the insurable interest
requirement. In Grigsby v. Russell, the Court explained that because life
insurance contracts should be given the “ordinary characteristics of
property,” the policyholder retained the right to transfer it to a group of
23
investors so long as the policy was taken out in good faith.
2. The Viatical Settlement Market
With the Supreme Court condoning the free transfer of life insurance
policies so long as policyholders agreed to them in good faith, investors
eventually found a way to profit by receiving the transfer of such policies.
The transfer of a life insurance policy to pay for medical services for
24
treatment of a disease is called a “viatical settlement.” The 1980s, the
height of the AIDS epidemic, saw the rise of a viatical settlement
25
industry, whereby individuals diagnosed with AIDS began transferring
26
their life insurance policies to third-party investors for a sum of money.
The viatical settlement industry refers to the widespread practice of
27
transferring life insurance contracts in exchange for cash. At the time,
AIDS frequently became fatal soon after diagnosis. As a result, those
28
afflicted with the disease often needed fast cash for treatment. Investors
were happy to be on the purchasing end of the policies—AIDS patients

21. 94 U.S. 457, 462 (1876).
22. Id. at 460.
23. 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911).
24. Id. at 286.
25. Some courts and scholars use the term “life settlement” rather than “viatical settlement.” For
clarity, this Note uses viatical settlement, but the terms are interchangeable. See Sachin Kohli, Pricing
Death: Analyzing the Secondary Market for Life Insurance Policies and its Regulatory Environment,
54 Buff. L. Rev. 279, 281 (2006) (“The transaction of selling one’s policy to a life settlement provider
is referred to as either a viatical settlement or a life settlement.”).
26. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2007).
27. See id.
28. Neil A. Doherty & Hal J. Singer, The Benefits of a Secondary Market for Life Insurance
Policies, 38 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 449, 450 (2003).
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had short life expectancies, which allowed investors to profit
handsomely—and AIDS victims could take advantage of cash payments
29
on policies that would not otherwise help them after their deaths.
The viatical settlement industry has grown rapidly in the past few
30
decades, expanding to cover many diseases. In 1989, life insurance
31
contracts were worth an estimated total of $5 million. In 1995, an
32
estimated $200 million worth of viatical settlements were sold. In 2005,
33
that figure rose to an estimated $13 billion. Some experts predict that
the total value of the viatical settlement industry could reach $160 billion
34
by 2030. The growth of the industry has also led to the growth of STOLI
transactions, probably because it is often unclear whether a life insurance
policy was assigned in good faith. Therefore, STOLI policies disguise
themselves as legitimate viatical settlements.
Viatical settlements, or any transfers of life insurance done in good
faith, are legal on the basis that an individual may freely transfer his or
her own property; however, some critics have called for regulation of the
industry due to the disparity in bargaining power between a large company
35
and a terminally ill individual in need of money. Another concern might
be that individuals could conceal an illness only to obtain a policy and flip
it immediately to a group of investors. Critical evaluations of the viatical
settlement industry are beyond the scope of this Note.
This Note describes the viatical settlement industry to highlight the
problem of modern STOLI schemes, which grew out of the burgeoning
viatical settlement industry. The key difference between viatical
settlements and STOLI policies is that under a viatical settlement the
insured originally agreed to the policy in good faith and intended to
remain the beneficiary, whereas with STOLI transactions, the insured
took out the policy in bad faith only for the purpose of transferring it to

29. Id. at 451 (“Policyholders benefit from improvements in the quality of their final days, and
investors benefit by having the opportunity to invest in a previously inaccessible asset class.”).
30. Joy D. Kosiewicz, Comment, Death for Sale: A Call to Regulate the Viatical Settlement
Industry, 48 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 701, 701–02 (1998).
31. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 n.1 (D.D.C. 1995).
32. Id.
33. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Life Insurers Face the Future, Grudgingly, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 2006,
at A11.
34. Id.
35. See Denise M. Schultz, Angels of Mercy or Greedy Capitalists? Buying Life Insurance Policies
from the Terminally Ill, 24 Pepp. L. Rev. 99, 110 (1996) (arguing for the codification of state viatical
regulations because they “seek to ensure that viatical settlement companies do not take advantage of a
viator’s vulnerability”); see also Miriam R. Albert, Selling Death Short: The Regulatory and Policy
Implications of Viatical Settlements, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 1013, 1031 n.92 (1998) (arguing that some
regulations that allow the viator to rescind a contract within thirty days may set up a “bargaining
game” that works to the viator’s disadvantage). See generally Kosiewicz, supra note 30.
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an investor. While viatical settlements are valid under the law, courts
have construed STOLI policies as illegitimate contracts that evade
37
insurable interest laws. COLI policies also lack an insurable interest in
the modern employment context.
3. Modern STOLI Arrangements
In the past decade, the litigation concerning STOLI policies has
increased as investors have become more sophisticated in concealing
38
STOLI schemes from insurers. A federal district court in New Jersey
recently summarized a typical modern STOLI transaction:
A typical STOLI transaction is structured as follows. An agent
attempts to sell a life insurance policy to an elderly insurable
candidate, and offers the candidate up-front cash in exchange for
promising a future sale of the policy. The agent informs the candidate
that the candidate will be able to obtain the policy at virtually no cost
to himself, because the agent has secured non-recourse financing to
purchase the policy. The candidate then acts as a “nominal grantor” of
a life insurance trust that is used to apply for the policy. “At that time,
the agent will tell the insured that, in all probability, the policy will be
sold to investors for a price that will pay the loan and accrued interest,
39
leaving a profit to split between the agent and the insured.”

The use of a trust to facilitate the transfer agreement is so common
in STOLI transactions that many states have explicitly mentioned the use
40
of trusts in their insurable interest laws. Most cases involve a life
insurance policy transferred by an individual to a group of investors and
41
the cases normally turn on a finding of good faith. A policy is purchased
in good faith when a person does not intend to transfer the policy at the

36. See Kosiewicz, supra note 30, at 701 (“Viatical settlements are available in all 50 states.”). For
an example of a state viatical settlement statute, see Cal. Ins. Code §§ 10113.1–13.3 (West 2013).
37. See, e.g., Pruco Life Ins. Co. v. Brasner, No. 10-80804, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156297, at *32–33
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2011) (invalidating a life insurance policy transferred without good faith and stating
that it “amounts to an illegal wagering contract”); see also AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin.
Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1356–57 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (denying a motion to dismiss a claim against a
bad faith transfer of a life insurance policy, stating: “Assuming the truth of the allegations of the amended
complaint as true, as the court must at this stage, the procurement and the assignment of the policies was
not done in good faith, but was part of a scheme devised by defendants to obtain interests in insurance
policies . . . in which the defendants had no insurable interest”).
38. See Joseph J. Hasman et al., Recent Developments in Health Insurance, Life Insurance, and
Disability Insurance Law, 47 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 247, 273–76 (2011) (summarizing recent
developments of STOLI litigation).
39. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d. 882, 885 (D.N.J. 2009) (citation omitted).
40. See, e.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 10110.1(d) (“Trusts and special purpose entities that are used to
apply for and initiate the issuance of policies of insurance for investors, where one or more
beneficiaries of those trusts or special purpose entities do not have an insurable interest in the life of
the insured, violate the insurable interest laws and the prohibition against wagering on life.”).
41. See, e.g., Pruco Life Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156297, at *23; see also Lincoln Nat’l Life
Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 722 F. Supp. 2d. 546 (D. Del. 2010).
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policy’s inception. If a transaction lacks good faith because the insured
never meant to remain as policy beneficiary, then the contract is a STOLI
transaction rather than a viatical settlement, and therefore violates the
insurable interest requirement.
Nearly all U.S. jurisdictions have adopted the insurable interest
43
requirement for life insurance contracts. States differ, however, as to
when an insurable interest is required to exist in order for a policy to be
upheld. A minority of states have enacted strict insurable interest laws
that require the insurable interest to exist at the time of the insured’s
44
death. However, forty-four states allow an individual to freely transfer
the policy so long as the contract was taken out and transferred in good
45
faith. Thus, most modern STOLI cases turn on a factual determination
of whether the insured acted in good faith in procuring and transferring
46
the policy.
C. COLI: A New Face for an Old Problem
1. The Emergence of COLI
COLI, also referred to as employer-owned life insurance (“EOLI”),
47
is a form of a life insurance contract between an employer and employee.
The corporation or employer owns the life insurance policy on the
employee, pays the premiums, and usually becomes the sole beneficiary
under the contract. Therefore, the employer collects any death benefits
when the insured employee dies. Many arrangements might include a
small percentage payout for the employee’s family.
COLI policies originally developed for the benefit of companies
taking out so-called “key-man” or “key-person” life insurance policies on
important employees whose deaths might result in financial loss to the
48
company. These types of policies “came to be accepted when [they]
involved key personnel and bore a rational relationship to the costs or
losses that might be expected to be incurred as a result of the death of the

42. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911).
43. Swisher, supra note 4, at 479.
44. Mathews, supra note 7, at 546.
45. Id. at 547.
46. For cases that turned on factual determinations of a good faith transfer, see supra note 41.
47. COLI is a bit of a misnomer because it applies not solely to corporations but to all profitmaking companies such as partnerships, business trusts, and limited liability partnerships. Stephan R.
Leimberg & Howard M. Zaritsky, IRS Provides New and Substantial Guidance on Employer-Owned
Life Insurance, Est. Plan., Aug. 2009. at 3, 4 n.3. While others use the term EOLI, for simplicity this
Note will continue to use the term COLI.
48. See Mathews, supra note 7, at 544; see also Charity Rush, Comment, Corporate-Owned Life
Insurance (A/K/A ‘Dead Peasant’ or ‘Dead Janitor’ Policies): Has Texas Buried the Insurable Interest
Requirement?, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 135, 140 (2004).
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49

person being insured.” States that adopted this exception for key-person
50
insurance usually required the consent of the insured employee.
The rationale behind key-person COLI policies is simple: a
company will lose financially if the key employee dies. An extreme
example of this would involve former Apple CEO Steve Jobs; prior to
Jobs’ death, Apple would presumably have an interest in Jobs staying
alive. Therefore, it would be in Apple’s best financial interest to take out
life insurance on Jobs’ life. Allowing this type of life insurance contract
satisfies two concerns: 1) Apple would not be incentivized for Jobs to die
early, given his value to the company, and 2) Apple would avoid a
financial loss in the case of Jobs’ death by being compensated through
51
the policy’s death benefits.
The main problem with this rationale is that it is difficult to determine
which employees constitute key people to a company. While Jobs would
certainly be considered a key person, would a high-profile manager of
Apple retail stores who earns $150,000 a year be considered a key
employee? Would it matter if the employee owned part of the company
and if so, how much would the employee have to own in order to be
considered a key person? What about an employee who works in the
Apple retail store but makes $20.00 per hour? Would it matter if that
same employee only made minimum wage? The answers to these
questions are difficult and demonstrate the gray area created by allowing
an employer to insure key employees.
Today, COLI policies are much broader and may extend to “any
employee regardless of the length of employment or the value of the
52
employee’s services.” Failing to comply with a state’s consent and
notice requirements, rather than lacking an insurable interest, tends to be
the only reason that COLI policies are invalidated. Some states, such as
Georgia, allow employers to have an insurable interest in retired
53
employees who do not currently work for the employer.

49. Stephan R. Leimberg & Albert E. Gibbons, COLI, BOLI, TOLI and ‘Insurable Interests’,
Est. Plan., July 2001, at 333, 333 (recognizing that under English common law no such prohibition
existed).
50. Id. at 334.
51. There is no indication Apple collected on a life insurance policy following Jobs’ death. The
hypothetical is used to demonstrate an extreme example of the rationale behind key-man insurance
policies. It is possible that, given Jobs’ medical condition, an insurer would not ensure Jobs or that the
premiums would be too high for Apple to take out such a policy.
52. Am. Elec. Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d. 762, 768 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
53. See Ga. Code Ann. § 33-24-3(d)(2) (2013) (permitting employers to have an insurable interest in
any “employee,” which includes retired employees). Georgia’s prior insurable interest statute defined
employee more broadly, including dependents of any employee. See George Steven Swan, The Law and
Economics of Company-Owned Life Insurance (COLI): Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 27 S. Ill. U. L.J. 357, 371 (2003). As of 2006, Georgia’s legislature removed the term
“dependent of any employee” from Georgia’s insurable interest statute. Ga. Code Ann. § 33-24-3(d)(2).
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2. Dead Peasant Insurance
Dead Peasant policies are extreme forms of COLI, whereby an
employer insures a large percentage of its employees, even rank-and-file
employees who are unlikely to be integral to the company’s success. In
the 1990s and 2000s, employers began to expand the number and range
of employees who they claimed to be key persons to include even those
54
who made relatively small salaries. In most cases, the employees did not
55
know that they were being covered.
These policies are often pejoratively called “Dead Peasant” or “Dead
56
Janitor” policies. Interestingly, the origin of the term “Dead Peasant”
57
comes from internal memos of an insurance company that became part of
the court’s record in Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
58
Circuit invalidated several COLI policies as “sham transactions.” Using
the terms “peasants” or “janitors” emphasizes the unimportance of the
employees covered and exposes the fact that many COLI policies run
contrary to the original intent behind key-person insurance.
3. Judicial Restraints on COLI
One of the first cases to highlight the potential abusive nature of
COLI policies involved the death of Felipe Tillman documented by the
59
Wall Street Journal in 1992. Tillman’s company, Camelot Music Inc.
(“Camelot”), purchased a COLI policy on Tillman and collected $339,302
60
following his death. Tillman was unaware of the policy, and his family
61
only found out after his death. In an article about his death, Felipe’s
brother Anthony Tillman expressed shock that a company could profit
off an employee’s death without notice to the employee or his family: “If
someone is going to use your name for something, even though you’re an

54. Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Companies Profit on Workers’ Deaths Through ‘Dead
Peasants’ Insurance, Wall St. J. (Apr. 19, 2002, 12:13 AM), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/april_19.htm.
55. Id.
56. Mike Myers, How “Dead Peasant” Insurance Got Its Name, Contingent Fee Bus. Litig.
Blog (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.contingentfeeblog.com/2008/08/articles/corporate-owned-lifeinsurance/how-dead-peasant-insurance-got-its-name.
57. Id. (quoting the exact language in the memorandum as stating “I want a summary sheet that
has . . . the Dead Peasants in the third column”).
58. Id. (“Thus, the phrase ‘dead peasant insurance’ is not a creation of the media. It is a term used
within the insurance industry to describe employees whose lives are insured by policies of corporate
owned life insurance for an employer’s benefit.”).
59. Schultz & Francis, supra note 54.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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employee of theirs, you should know what’s going on in your name . . .
62
[i]t isn’t fair.”
Years later, Tillman’s estate sued Camelot under an Oklahoma
statute that allows insurance proceeds to be recovered if an insurance
63
contract did not contain an insurable interest on the insured’s life. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that Camelot did not have an insurable interest in Tillman because it
could not prove that Tillman’s value to the company outweighed any
64
potential gain from insurance proceeds following his death. This Note
argues below that most employees’ insurance policies similarly lack an
insurable interest because most employees are replaceable.
65
Mayo v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., a case involving a class action
lawsuit against three large corporations, is perhaps the most famous case
involving a Dead Peasant policy. In Mayo, Camelot, Transworld
Entertainment Corporation, and Wal-Mart (collectively “corporate
defendants”), challenging the death benefits received from COLI
66
policies. The class of plaintiffs included former employees and estates of
67
deceased employees of the corporate defendants. The corporate
defendants had purchased COLI policies on a large number of their
employees during the disputed time period: Camelot had purchased life
insurance on every employee that worked more than twenty hours per
68
week and Wal-Mart had purchased policies on every hourly employee.
The issue in the case concerned the validity of the policies under Texas
insurable interest statutes and whether the corporate defendants could
retain money collected as death benefits on the deceased former
69
employees.
The portion of the case that involved Wal-Mart only concerned the
validity of Wal-Mart’s policy to insure all hourly employees. The
plaintiffs argued that the corporate defendants’ COLI practice violated
the Texas insurable interest statute because the companies did not have a
70
valid insurable interest in the employees. Therefore, the company was
not entitled to be a beneficiary of the policy or to keep any death
benefits. Wal-Mart argued that it had a valid insurable interest in all of

62. Id.
63. Tillman ex rel. Estate of Tillman v. Camelot Music, Inc., No. 02-0761, 2005 WL 3436484, at *1
(N.D. Okla. Dec. 14, 2005).
64. Tillman ex rel. Estate of Tillman v. Camelot Music, Inc., 408 F.3d 1300, 1306–07 (10th Cir.
2005), on remand, 2005 WL 3436484, at *1.
65. 220 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
66. Id. at 722.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 722–24.
69. Id. at 722.
70. Id. at 724.
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its employees’ lives because “‘as a group’ all employees were ‘important
to the company’s profitability and to the continuing functioning of its
71
business.’”
The District Court rejected Wal-Mart’s argument and held that WalMart’s practice of insuring all hourly employees violated the insurable
72
interest requirement. The court reasoned that the COLI policies were
against public policy because Wal-Mart could not prove that it did not
73
have an incentive in procuring the early death of its employees. The
decision reemphasized the original policy arguments for creating the
insurable interest requirement: the policyholder should not have an
interest in the speedy death of the insured in order to reap a lucrative
74
payout. Part II.B of this Note points out several ways an employer
might be incentivized to accelerate the death of its employee.
Tillman and Mayo represent cases in which extreme forms of
COLI—or Dead Peasant policies—were invalidated due to a lack of an
insurable interest under a specific state statute. These cases demonstrate
that there are limits to a company’s abuse of the COLI system with
extreme policies that cover nearly all rank-and-file employees. However,
as this Note argues in Part II, COLI policies create policy concerns in
general. These extreme cases are not the only types of policies that
courts and legislatures should be concerned with because many modern
day insurance policies lack an insurable interest.

II. Policy Concerns for COLI
Aside from courts, scholars have often criticized Dead Peasant
75
policies as being against public policy. Most of this criticism has focused
76
on the fact that the policies have often lacked consent and notice.
However, COLI policies create several other public policy concerns:
1) the policies lack a legitimate insurable interest because there is often
an arbitrary connection between the employee’s value to the company
and the financial gain that an employer can make from the employee’s
death; 2) the policies create an improper incentive for employers to
accelerate the deaths of their employees; 3) the policies are funded by
American taxpayers for the benefit of both the employers and insurance
71. Rush, supra note 48, at 149 (quoting Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 794, 801–
03 (S.D. Tex. 2002)).
72. Mayo, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 737–38.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Corporate-Owned Life Insurance: Another Financial Scheme
That Takes Advantage of Employees and Shareholders, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 653, 676–77 (2004).
76. Id. (“It is unseemly for businesses to benefit from the deaths of their employees, some of
whom may have been terminated many years before, without the employees’ having agreed to the
arrangement or, in fact, having known about it.”).
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companies; and 4) the policies are morally reprehensible as a form of
life-wagering similar to STOLI policies.
A. COLI Lacks a Legitimate Insurable Interest
Charles de Gaulle is credited with the famous phrase: “The
77
cemeteries of the world are full of indispensable men.” As callous as it
sounds, there is truth to the quote in the modern employment relationship.
Most large companies are able to replace key employees without being
subject to financial ruin. If all employees are replaceable, then all COLI
policies lack a legitimate insurable interest. Even for employees who are
perceived as valuable to a company, a life insurance payout is not
adequate to compensate the company for the loss. Even Jobs, who might
have been one of the people most indispensable to his company, was
arguably replaced with relative ease by Apple, and even if this were not
the case, a life insurance payout would be inadequate to compensate for
78
the loss of Jobs to the company.
While many claim that Apple has thrived because Jobs has left the
79
company in great shape to succeed, it is apparent that Apple would not
have benefitted from an insurance payout upon Jobs’ death in the long
term. Any money paid out by the policy would have only added extra
lining to the company’s profits. In order to remain competitive over time,
80
many believe that Apple must remain a leading innovator. In other
words, to the extent that Jobs was irreplaceable for his ability to
77. Steve Lohr, Op-Ed., One Day You’re Indispensable, the Next Day . . ., N.Y. Times, Jan. 18,
2009, at WK3.
78. Art Levinson replaced Jobs as Chairman of the Board and Tim Cook became CEO and both
were highly qualified to fill in. Levinson served as CEO of Genentech for fourteen years, wrote or cowrote over eighty published scientific papers, and was named as inventor on eleven U.S. patents.
Philip Elmer-DeWitt, The Man Who Replaced Steve Jobs as Chairman of the Board, CNN Money
(Nov. 16, 2011, 11:01 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/16/the-man-who-replaced-steve-jobsas-chairman-of-the-board. Institutional Investor named him “America’s Best CEO” in biotech for four
straight years, and Businessweek named him one of the best managers in 2004 and 2005. Id. Cook
served as Apple’s Chief Operating Officer for seven years and had over twelve years of executive
experience working at Compaq and IBM. Steven Musil, A Look at Tim Cook, the Man Replacing
Steve Jobs, CNET News (Aug. 24, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-20096918-37/alook-at-tim-cook-the-man-replacing-steve-jobs. In the year following Jobs’ death, Apple continued to
thrive. In 2011, the company held a market capitalization worth $629.4 billion and put out the
iPhone 5, which sold between six and ten million units within two weeks. Jon Swartz, Year After Jobs’
Death, How High Can Apple Fly?, USA Today, Oct. 5, 2012, at A1. At one point in 2012, Apple stock
shares were up over eighty percent from the time of Jobs’ death. David Goldman, Apple’s Post-Steve
Tipping Point, CNN Money (Oct. 5, 2012, 9:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/05/
technology/apple-steve-jobs/index.html. The Apple stock price has declined since 2012, but is still well
above the below $400 a share that it was trading for when Jobs died. Balaji Viswanathan, Why Is
Apple Stock Falling Down?, Forbes (Feb. 13, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/
2013/02/13/why-is-apple-stock-falling-down.
79. Swartz, supra note 78.
80. Id.
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innovate, a cash payment from a life insurance policy would not have
helped Apple stay on top of the tech market. This analogy is simplified to
illustrate that even employees who are seen as integral to a company’s
success are replaceable to some extent.
The Apple example highlights the fact that employers, especially
large corporations, do not need insurance proceeds to serve as protection
against the possibility of losing important employees. Companies
81
especially do not need tax breaks for the proceeds from such policies. A
true insurable interest does not exist in the modern employment
relationship; employees have become dispensable and companies have
learned to cope with the loss of any employee, even the most highly paid
officer.
The primary rationale behind life insurance is to make sure that a
family is not left destitute in the case of a family member’s death. While
this rationale might exist for some small businesses, it does not exist for
large corporations. Thus, the modern employment context resembles a
famous exchange between James Bond and his nemesis Auric Goldfinger
in the 1964 movie Goldfinger:
Goldfinger [Speaking to Bond, who is about to be cut in half by a
laser]: “There is nothing you can talk to me about that I don’t already
know.”
Bond: “Well you’re forgetting one thing. If I fail to report, 008 replaces
me.”
82
Goldfinger: “I trust he will be more successful.”

As challenging or difficult as any job may be, a corporation will not
be left destitute simply due to the death of one employee. Modern day
employers can survive the loss of an employee without reaping federal
tax benefits.
B. Accelerating the Death of the Employee
Due to the lack of an insurable interest, the COLI system creates a
scenario by which an employer is incentivized for her employee to die
quickly. This rationale formed the basis for the court’s conclusion in
Mayo. But even if some courts invalidate extreme forms of COLI or
Dead Peasant policies, this improper incentive will usually exist in the
context of COLI unless the employer has a true insurable interest in a
key employee.
The incentive that one might have to accelerate the death of the
insured formed the basis for the insurable interest requirement. COLI

81. For a discussion on the tax breaks afforded to companies who collect profits on COLI, see
discussion infra Part II.C.
82. Goldfinger (Eon Productions 1964).
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policies create the same incentive for an employer: An employer could
overwork an employee or become less concerned about dangerous
working conditions. A company could place insured workers into more
dangerous jobs or spend less money on safety accommodations.
Additionally, COLI policies may have contributed to the decisions that
several companies have made to refuse to provide employees with health
83
care plans.
While some of these scenarios might seem extreme, it is not difficult
to imagine a large corporation employing many of these tactics. Even small
businesses might be susceptible to some of these problems; although not
necessarily acting maliciously, the insurance policy might be a factor in the
company’s decision to provide the employee with fewer accommodations.
For example, if a company of forty workers is choosing whether to provide
health insurance to its employees, it may be persuaded not to do so if it
also happens to have a life insurance policy out on every employee. The
small company may not actively want its employees to die, but may be
incentivized enough by the death benefits and tax advantages that come
from failing to provide health insurance. Moreover, the larger a company
is, the stronger these incentives will be. Although it is impossible to know
whether employers have purposely taken risks to ensure the accelerated
death of their employees, with the COLI system the possibility exists for
companies to exploit any possible advantage to increase profit.
C. Taxpayers Fund COLI
Additionally, COLI policies are problematic because they are
expensive for taxpayers. Given that the policies lack a legitimate
insurable interest, companies should not be able to profit at the expense
of taxpayers.
Employers and insurance companies can reap profits from COLI
policies due to the tax benefits afforded to life insurance proceeds. Prior
to 1996, companies benefitted from two distinct tax advantages: 1) the
ability to deduct interest on loans taken out to finance COLI policies
(“deductibility of interest advantage”); and 2) excluding death benefits
received on policies from gross income when reporting federal taxes

83. As of October 2005, only forty-four percent of Wal-Mart’s 1.3 million workers in the United
States were provided with health insurance. See Aaron Bernstein, A Stepped-Up Assault on Wal-Mart,
Businessweek (Oct. 19, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-10-19/a-stepped-up-assaulton-wal-mart. Under the Affordable Care Act, companies with more than fifty employees will be
required to provide health insurance for employees and dependents starting in 2014. See I.R.C.
§ 4980H (2011). However, under new rules promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to
the Affordable Care Act, employers will not be subject to any penalties for failure to provide coverage
if family coverage is unaffordable to those employees. See Robert Pear, Employers Must Offer Family
Care, Affordable or Not, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 2013, at A13.
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84

(“death benefits exclusion”). The deductibility of interest advantage was
eliminated by Congress through the enactment of the Health Insurance
85
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. The death benefits exclusion
remains in place although Congress limited it through Congressional
amendments to the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (“PPA”). Because the
death benefits exclusion is still in place, this Note primarily focuses on that
tax advantage.
Under the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), any money received
on the payout of a life insurance policy is excluded from gross income and
86
not subject to federal income taxation. Therefore, the beneficiary of a
87
policy collects any money received tax-free when an insured dies. The
PPA narrowed the type of employees whose death benefits could be
88
excluded from gross income. Part III of this Note analyzes the
amendments to the PPA and the current state of the law and argues that
the amendments have not removed all the tax benefits an employer enjoys,
especially the benefits for large corporations, with the result that Dead
Peasant policies have continued to thrive.
Mayo demonstrates how larger companies can exploit the death
benefits exclusion: the larger the company and the number of employees
insured, the greater the likelihood that the company will profit. WalMart’s scheme—at issue in Mayo—was calculated: it insured every
hourly employee, knowing that enough would die to allow Wal-Mart to
turn a profit. This type of scheme benefits larger companies: with more
employees, a company could be more confident that enough death
benefits could accrue to help the company. Given that it is extremely
unlikely that Wal-Mart considers every employee to be irreplaceable, the
policy to insure all hourly employees is a statistical method of taking
advantage of the tax benefits from COLI. Moreover, the case
demonstrates how COLI policies might be more profitable if taken out
on lower-income workers. Life expectancy is negatively correlated with
income—the less money an individual makes the more likely that
89
individual will die at an early age.

84. See generally Craig E. Behrenfeld & Erica Good Pless, Employer-Owned Life Insurance After
the Pension Protection Act of 2006, 83 Fla. B.J. 47, 47–48 (2009).
85. Id.
86. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1).
87. See In re CM Holdings, Inc., 254 B.R. 578, 581 (D. Del. 2000), aff’d, 301 F.3d 96 (3d Cir.
2002); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 2d 748, 756 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
88. See discussion infra Part III.A.
89. The first famous international study of this correlation was conducted by Samuel H. Preston
when he created the so-called “Preston Curve,” which analyzed rich and poor nations comparatively.
See Samuel H. Preston, The Changing Relation Between Mortality and Level of Economic
Development, 29 Population Stud. 231, 231 (1975). More recent studies demonstrate that the
correlation between income and life expectancy in the United States has grown in the past couple of
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Companies and insurers both profit from the tax system created by
the death benefits exclusion. Because an employer can gain large sums of
money by excluding death benefits from its reported income, it can take
on more risk in purchasing policies on an employee, which allows
insurance companies to profit through premiums. Due to the fact that
insurers are not required to disclose anything about profits from issuing
COLI policies, it is impossible to determine how much insurers profit.
However, some data suggest that COLI insurance is more profitable than
other types of insurance for the big insurers. For example, in the first
nine months of 2002, Money Group Inc.’s sales of life insurance to
companies increased by 128% to a total of $124 million, while all other life
90
insurance sales fell three percent. Therefore, employers were not the only
entities to abuse the system created by the death benefits exclusion—
insurance companies continued to issue COLI policies even under
circumstances where the insurance might not be for key employees.
The death benefits exclusion creates a public policy concern because
taxpayers are funding COLI policies for large corporations and insurance
companies. Tax revenues that would otherwise be collected are given back
to the companies rather than taxpayers. The federal government could
spend tax money gained by an elimination of the death benefits exclusion
on fiscal programs or give it back to individuals in the form of tax credits.
Even if COLI policies were rationally justified as key-man policies (this
Note argues they are not), it is still problematic that the public must fund
the tax breaks gained from the payout on these policies. The system
created is one in which money flows from the taxpayers to support a
gamble that allows insurance companies and large corporations to profit.
Even if other public policy concerns were not present, at the very least
corporations and insurers should have to take risks without the benefit of
taxpayer money.
D. Moral Reprehensibility of Life-Wagering
In addition to the other policy concerns outlined in this section,
gambling on employees’ lives is morally wrong. A modern rationale that
lies behind the insurable interest requirement concerns “the immorality

decades. See Sabrina Tavernise, Life Spans Shrink for Least-Educated Whites in U.S., N.Y. Times
(Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/us/life-expectancy-for-less-educated-whites-in-usis-shrinking.html; see also Paul Krugman, Live Long and Prosper, N.Y. Times The Conscience of a
Liberal Blog (Aug. 13, 2010, 2:36 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/live-long-andprosper-2.
90. Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, How Life Insurance Morphed into a Corporate Finance
Tool, Wall St. J. (Dec. 30, 2002), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/dec_30_one.htm.

L - Burns_13 (Do Not Delete)

February 2014]

1/29/2014 6:37 PM

PEASANTS’ REVOLT

569
91

inherent in gambling on the life of another human being.” Courts have
applied this rationale, which dates back to nineteenth-century common
92
law, when invalidating modern STOLI policies.
In the modern employment arrangement, many employees do not
know the owners of the company that employs them. Therefore, COLI
policies create parties that are as unfamiliar to each other as those of
STOLI policies. Only in a small business context would the purchaser of
a policy be well acquainted with an individual. Even in such a context, an
employer holding COLI on its employees should be forced to prove it
has a valid insurable interest; otherwise the policy is tantamount to a
wagering contract on a human being’s life.

III. Analyzing the Congressional Response
COLI and Dead Peasant policies continue to thrive as the death
benefits exclusion remains in place. While Congress has acted to limit
some of the profits employers and insurers can reap from the COLI
system, the congressional response has not eliminated COLI. In fact,
congressional action has created additional problems for the COLI
system. This Part first summarizes two congressional responses created
by the PPA: 1) the death benefits exclusion; and 2) the consent and
notice requirements. This Part then analyzes the changes in the law,
summarizing the current state of COLI and criticizing the inadequacy of
congressional action.
A. Congressional Response Created by the PPA
1. The Narrowing of the Death Benefits Exclusion
With the spotlight on Dead Peasant policies following Mayo,
Congress set its sights on reforming COLI to end the practice of Dead
Peasant policies. Prior to 2006, most companies benefitted from the
death benefits exclusion, even after Congress ended the ability for
companies to deduct interest on loans taken out to purchase COLI with
the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
93
in 1996. However, early legislative attempts specifically designed to
94
address the problems of COLI failed. In 2006, Congress passed reform

91. Robert S. Bloink, Catalysts for Clarification: Modern Twists on the Insurable Interest
Requirement for Life Insurance, 17 Conn. Ins. L.J. 55, 60 (2010).
92. “A policy, obtained by a party who has no interest in the subject of insurance, is a mere wager
policy.” Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 940 N.E. 2d 535, 539 (2010) (quoting Ruse v. Mut. Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. 516, 523 (1861)).
93. See discussion supra note 85.
94. In 2002, Congressman Gene Green (D-Tex.) introduced a bill requiring notification to
employees for COLI policies, but the bill died in committee. See Rush, supra note 48, at 161 n.190.
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through amendments to the Code as part of the PPA. The act primarily
addressed employee pension plans, but the revisions to the Code were
96
specifically designed to prevent the abuse of Dead Peasant policies.
The Code section 101(a)(1) provides the general rule for excluding
insurance benefits from total income: “Except as otherwise provided
in . . . subsection (j), gross income does not include amounts received
(whether in a single sum or otherwise) under a life insurance contract, if
97
such amounts are paid by reason of the death of the insured.” Because
of this exclusion, individuals or companies can receive a payout on a life
insurance contract without having to pay any federal income tax.
The PPA amendments, which added section 101(j), limited this
exclusion by shielding COLI policies from exemption under the general
98
income provision. Therefore, a widow, for example, could continue to
exclude death benefits received from her husband’s death on a policy in
which she is a beneficiary under 101(a)(1). On the other hand, a company
generally cannot exclude death benefits on a policy it took out on its
employee under 101(j).
However, Congress also created an exception to the exception; in
other words, the 101(j) exception only applies to certain COLI plans, while
others are still subject to the 101(a)(1) exclusion. Section 101(j)(2)(A)
effectively allows a company to continue to exclude death benefits from
total income in the following situations: 1) the insured under the policy
was an employee within twelve months of the insured’s death; 2) the
insured was a director; or 3) the insured was a “highly compensated
employee,” defined as within the thirty-five percent of income-earners at
99
the company. These limitations comport with the original rationale
behind key-person COLI policies by not allowing employers to gain
advantage of the death benefits exclusion for plans involving employees
who are not integral to the company’s success. In sum, the PPA attempted
to eliminate Dead Peasant policies by narrowing the range of employees

Senator John Edwards (D-N.C.) and Congressman Rahm Emanuel (D-Ill.) introduced similar bills in
2003, but they never passed. Id.
95. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
96. For a summary of the provisions of the PPA specifically addressing COLI policies, see
generally Behrenfeld & Pless, supra note 84.
97. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2012).
98. Id. § 101(j)(1).
99. Id. § 101(j)(2)(A). The full text of subsection (A) states, “[e]xceptions based on insured’s
status: Any amount received by reason of the death of an insured who, with respect to an applicable
policyholder—(i) was an employee at any time during the 12-month period before the insured’s death,
or (ii) is, at the time the contract is issued—(I) a director, (II) a highly compensated employee within
the meaning of section 414(q) . . . or (III) a highly compensated individual within the meaning of
section 105(h)(5), except that ‘35 percent’ shall be substituted for ‘25 percent’ in subparagraph (C)
thereof.” Id.
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eligible for an employer to claim death benefits tax-free, but still allows an
employer to exclude such benefits for current or important employees.
2. Consent and Notice requirements
The PPA also amended the Code by requiring employers to obtain
the consent of and give notice to employees before being eligible to claim
the 101(a)(1) exclusion of gross income. Section 101(j)(4), which outlines
notice and consent requirements, reads as follows:
The notice and consent requirements of this paragraph are met if,
before the issuance of the contract, the employee—
(A) is notified in writing that the applicable policyholder intends to
insure the employee’s life and the maximum face amount for which the
employee could be insured at the time the contract was issued,
(B) provides written consent to being insured under the contract and
that such coverage may continue after the insured terminates
employment, and
(C) is informed in writing that an applicable policyholder will be a
100
beneficiary of any proceeds payable upon the death of the employee.

Therefore, in order for the 101(a)(1) exclusion to be triggered, an
employer must obtain consent from the employee, even if it was not
limited by the 101(j) exception. For example, a company would have to
obtain the consent of its CEO even if she was the highest paid person in
the company in order to claim the death benefits exclusion upon that
CEO’s death. While the consent and notice requirements apply to all
employees, Congress most likely enacted consent and notice requirements
in response to the highly publicized Dead Peasant cases, such as that of
101
Felipe Tillman.
B. Additional Problems Created by Congress
1. Unanswered Questions Under the PPA
While the congressional amendments are significant in limiting COLI,
the current law does not go far enough in preventing the dangers of COLI
outlined in Part II. First, the law leaves important questions unanswered,
allowing large companies to utilize loopholes and continue to abuse COLI.
Secondly, the law focuses too heavily on consent and notice but fails to
consider the insurable interest requirement in COLI policies.
The first problem not addressed by the PPA is the ability of large
companies to exploit tax advantages. The new law creates a one-size-fitsall standard for allowing companies to claim tax benefits under COLI

100. Id. § 101(j)(4).
101. See discussion supra notes 59–64.
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policies because the statute does not distinguish between big and small
businesses. The exceptions to the exception (or the provisions in
section 101(j)(2)(A) that re-trigger the death benefits exclusion) apply
102
regardless of the size of a company. Therefore, a company of any size
may insure any employee within the top thirty-five percent of incomeearners of the company and collect tax-free death benefits at a later date.
By failing to distinguish between company sizes, the advantages for
big companies to abuse COLI remain in effect. For example, suppose a
small business insures all forty of its employees under a life insurance plan.
After the employee passes away, the small business would be denied the
tax-free benefits for twenty-six of those employees and be able to collect
tax-free benefits on only fourteen of the employees. In contrast, Wal103
Mart, who has approximately two million employees, would be able to
collect tax-free death benefits on 700,000 employees. This discrepancy is
problematic because it is not difficult to imagine how all forty employees
for the small business might be integral to the company’s success,
whereas a large percentage of the 700,000 Wal-Mart employees are likely
to be easily replaceable. Therefore, there is no need to compensate WalMart in the case of the death of those employees because Wal-Mart does
not have a legitimate insurable interest in the employees.
Another important point not addressed by the PPA concerns how
long an employee has to work at the company in order for the company
to claim tax-free benefits. Part of what made Dan and Irma Johnson’s
104
story seem so egregious to viewers of Michael Moore’s film, Capitalism:
A Love Story, was the fact that Dan Johnson had only worked for Wal105
Mart for a couple of months. Under the PPA, the ability of Wal-Mart
to insure Dan would continue so long as he was compensated in the top
thirty-five percent of the company or employed within the last twelve
months before his death.
This problem could have been easily fixed by the new law. For
example, Congress could have enacted a provision requiring a year’s
worth of service as a reasonably low bar for an employer to claim taxfree benefits. Requiring a certain amount of time would ensure that the
employee is valuable to the company. One counterargument might be

102. The COLI amendments under the PPA do not distinguish between companies based on size.
In comparison, the Affordable Care Act is an example of a law that distinguishes between large and
small companies. See discussion supra note 83. Under that law, large companies comprise those with
more than fifty employees and those large companies are subject to requirements to provide health
insurance for employees.
103. Loren Berlin, Walmart’s How Big? What the Huge Numbers Really Mean, DailyFinance
(May 28, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/05/28/walmarts-how-big-what-the-hugenumbers-really-mean.
104. See supra notes 1–3.
105. See supra note 1.
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that a newly-hired CEO would not be eligible for the gross income
exclusion under this type of law. Therefore, the best way the law could
be written is to create a length of time requirement that varies depending
on the type of employees. Highly-compensated employees and directors
could be subject to a very short time period such as one week, whereas
rank-and-file employees could be subject to a longer requirement such as
one year.
2. Over-Focusing on Consent and Notice
One potential reason that the above concerns were left unaddressed
might be that Congress figured that requiring consent and notice solved
most of the problems that lay behind Dead Peasant policies. After all,
many of the popular stories documenting the abuse of COLIs taken out
on rank-and-file employees involved people who did not consent and
106
were not given notice to such policies. Some scholars predicted that the
101(j)(4) requirements would standardize notice and consent across the
107
insurance industry, but issues concerning whether consent was properly
108
obtained still persist despite these requirements.
Congress should turn its focus to amending the PPA in a way that is
consistent with the insurable interest requirement by forcing employers
to demonstrate a true insurable interest in the life of the employee under
the COLI policy before they gain any tax advantages. The prior
amendments ultimately fail to restrict the ability of companies to take
out COLI on employees. While Congress might have thought that the
limitation for policies on employees within the top thirty-five percent of
income-earners brought the tax breaks in line with the insurable interest
requirement, this is an inadequate measure to ensure the policies have a
valid insurable interest. The focus of Congress should turn toward
strengthening the limitations to provide that a company may only enjoy
tax breaks if the policies have a valid insurable interest. Such a
requirement would ensure that employers would not be incentivized to
have their employees die early. This would preserve the public policy
rationales for the insurable interest requirement in the employment
context.

106. The policies taken out on Dan Johnson, see supra notes 1–3, and Felipe Tillman, see supra
notes 59–64, lacked notice and consent.
107. See, e.g., Behrenfeld & Pless, supra note 84.
108. For example, Irma Johnson’s lawsuit against Amegy Bank alleged that the bank knew that
Johnson was cognitively impaired when he signed forms to comply with state consent requirements.
Ashby Jones, ‘Dead Peasant’ Policies: The Next Big Thing in Insurance Litigation, Wall St. J.
(Feb. 24, 2009, 10:24 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/02/24/dead-peasant-policies-the-next-bigthing-in-insurance-litigation.
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Additionally, consent might not be a difficult barrier for Dead
Peasant policies, especially in a poor economy. If a worker has been
unemployed for more than one year and is offered a job so long as she
consents to a life insurance policy, it is doubtful that the employee would
withhold consent. It is hard to imagine a minimum-wage employee at
Wal-Mart withdrawing consent for a life insurance policy, especially if
consent to the policy is a precondition to a job offer.
More importantly, obtaining consent has no bearing on the
insurable interest question; simply because an employee agrees to an
insurance policy does not change the interest the company has in the
longevity of the employee. Giving proper consent and notice might make
the policy seem less reprehensible in cases where the employee was
never notified and never agreed to the policy, such as Dan Johnson’s
policy. But the focus around consent and notice fails to address the
central problem with COLI policies, which is the circumvention of the
insurable interest requirement. The lack of consent and notice to an
employee is not the greatest danger of Dead Peasant insurance; rather,
the incentive a company might have to accelerate the death of its
workers is the gravest policy concern.
C. Current State of COLI: Dead Peasant Policies Are Not Dead
Although the 2006 congressional amendments attempted to weaken
the practice of Dead Peasant policies, there are indications that companies
continue to exploit the death benefits exclusion. It is difficult to determine
the extent to which companies are purchasing life insurance on their
employees primarily because most companies are not required to disclose
109
such information. Only banks are required to disclose ownership of
110
Dead Peasant policies. While it is unknown how many COLI polices are
being purchased by companies, the amount that banks have purchased
indicates that COLI remains a profitable investment for companies.
Banks continued to take out millions of dollars in insurance
premiums on their own employees after 2006. In the first quarter of 2009,
Bank of America held $17.3 billion in life insurance on its workers;
Wachovia held $12 billion; JPMorgan Chase & Co. held $11.1 billion;
111
and Wells Fargo held $5.7 billion. At the end of 2008, banks had
112
$122.3 billion in life insurance on their employees. This figure was
113
double what banks had at the end of 2004, demonstrating that the 2006
amendments had little effect on the total money banks held in life
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Schultz & Francis, supra note 54.
Id.
Ellen E. Schultz, Banks Use Life Insurance to Fund Bonuses, Wall St. J., May 20, 2009, at C1.
Id.
Id.
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insurance on their employees. Consultants estimate that over the coming
114
decades, banks will receive $400 billion in total death benefits.
The continuation of Dead Peasant policies is not solely limited to
banks. It is unclear how much money other companies have spent on life
insurance for employees. However, the Wall Street Journal identified
companies that still held substantial COLI assets in 2009 including Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, American International Group Inc. (“AIG”) and
115
Tyson Foods Inc. If the figures that show the total amount of money
banks hold are an indication of the benefits of COLI, it is likely that
several other large corporations continue to collect billions of dollars in
death benefits from COLI.
Companies do not need taxpayer-funded death benefits to cover the
loss of any of their employees and COLI policies should be viewed as
illegal wagering schemes that evade the insurable interest requirement.
Each state and Congress should act immediately to eliminate or weaken
COLI. The need for action is heightened by the fact that the practice of
abusing COLI has continued despite the 2006 amendments.

IV. Possible Solutions
Three possible legal solutions exist to deal with eliminating or
weakening Dead Peasant policies: 1) States can amend insurable interest
statutes to explicitly block an employer from insuring its employees;
2) Congress can amend the Pension Protection Act by eliminating
section 101(j) entirely and remove the tax-free benefits enjoyed by
companies for their COLI policies; or 3) Congress can amend the PPA
less drastically by distinguishing between large and small companies and
addressing other problems with the law that are discussed in Part III
above. The first solution would be the most robust way to eliminate the
abuse of COLI policies, but is extremely impractical since each state
would have to amend its insurable interest laws separately. The second
solution is the strongest way for the federal government to deal with the
issue but might be politically unpopular. The third solution is the most
practical, but would also be less effective than the other two options.
A. Amending Insurable Interest Statutes State by State
The first solution is for each state to eliminate the ability of an
employer to insure its own employees. States could remove any language
such as “substantial economic interest” from the insurable interest statutes
or explicitly mention that an employment relationship is not enough to
satisfy the insurable interest requirement. However, there may be
114. Id.
115. Id.
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situations other than employment where a substantial economic interest
qualifies for an insurable interest. Therefore, the best option is for each
state to specifically address COLI policies. Most states have already
enacted insurable interest statutes that are designed to address modernday STOLI arrangements. Therefore, states could easily add a section to
the same set of statutes to eliminate COLI specifically while retaining the
language for “substantial economic interest.”
This solution is impractical because it would have to be enacted on a
state-by-state basis; it is difficult for the federal government to alter
insurance law. Insurance law has traditionally been regulated by the
116
Technically, the federal government under the McCarranstates.
Ferguson Act can preempt state insurance law if the legislation specifically
117
mentions that it intends to regulate insurance. However, it might be
difficult to persuade Congress to pass a sweeping law that would alter the
states’ insurable interest statutes.
Absent federal legislation, all fifty states would have to eliminate
COLI in order for this solution to be effective. If one state refuses to
adopt this kind of insurable interest statute, then a large company could
incorporate itself there in hopes of continuing the practice of insuring its
118
employees. Although it is not clear whether the lure for favorable
COLI laws would prompt a business to incorporate in certain states, this
solution leaves room for companies to exploit favorable laws from states
that have failed to enact laws to combat COLI.
B. Congress Should Eliminate Section 101(j)
The most effective solution is for Congress to amend the provisions
of the Code to eliminate life insurance proceeds as being exempt from
gross income for COLI policies. Congress has already specifically

116. For a comprehensive history of the development of state insurance regulation and issues of
federalism around insurance regulation, see generally Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the
United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 625 (1999).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012) (“No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance.”).
118. The decision of a company to re-incorporate in a different state to obtain favorable laws is not
an uncommon phenomenon. For example, companies have re-incorporated in Delaware due to
favorable corporate law and tax advantages. See John W. Edwards II, Busy Bees and Busybodies: The
Extraterritorial Reach of California Corporate Law, 11 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 1, 3–5 (2010) (discussing
the advantages companies gain from Delaware corporate law); see also Leslie Wayne, How Delaware
Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. Times (June 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/
business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html.
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addressed COLI policies in the 2006 amendments to the PPA. Here,
Congress would be eliminating the practice entirely.
This solution has numerous advantages. First, it would completely
thwart the ability of large corporations to carry Dead Peasant policies.
Companies would be greatly restrained in their efforts to profit from
taxpayer funding through the death benefits exclusion on their COLI
policies. Second, this solution would reinforce the insurable interest
requirement. Any investor who accepts the transfer of a life insurance
policy must still prove an insurable interest—employment would no
longer be a basis for doing so. Third, because Congress is amending the
law, employers in all states would be forced to abide by it.
One counterargument against this solution might be that an
elimination of section 101(j) is too drastic because it would thwart small
companies from being able to insure their own employees. However,
because employers in a modern age should be ready to replace any
employee, there is no need for small companies to insure their own
employees. Furthermore, eliminating the death benefits exclusion does
not prevent a company from insuring its employees; it would only thwart
the ability of that small company to claim any death benefits tax-free. If a
company of ten people relies on all ten people and would be greatly hurt
if any employee died, the company may still insure all ten employees.
Under this solution, the company would merely lose the ability to claim
death benefits tax free.
Given that Dead Peasant policies are objectionable because
companies profit from employees’ deaths, eliminating tax benefits would
eliminate most of the public policy concerns associated with COLI. This
solution naturally hurts bigger companies more because they are the
ones who rely on the tax benefits in order to turn a profit. Large
companies may still choose to insure CEOs or other highly compensated
employees. Eliminating the tax benefits would likely lead to the gradual
elimination of the practice and at least taxpayer money would not be
supporting the practice.
A disadvantage of this approach is that it may not be politically
popular. The counterarguments raised above might be used to dismiss
the solution and it may be seen as a drastic solution. Therefore, this Note
proposes one final argument to fix the law with a more nuanced, less
drastic congressional approach.
C. Congress Should Amend the PPA
The final solution is for Congress to amend the PPA by leaving the
death benefits exclusion in place but limiting its application. This
119. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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solution accounts for the questions that are unanswered by the PPA
identified in Part III, supra.
First, the law should distinguish big companies from small
companies. The one-size-fits-all nature of the law should change so that
large companies cannot continue to exploit the profits available from
Dead Peasant policies. Congress could amend the law in several different
ways: 1) placing a cap on the number of employees whose death benefits
might be claimed as exempt from gross income; 2) placing a cap on the
total dollar amount of life insurance a company may take out; or
3) creating a system where the larger a company is the more restricted it
is in claiming death benefits.
The third option outlined above would weaken the ability of
companies to take out Dead Peasant policies because large corporations
would face restrictions on how many rank-and-file employees they could
ensure. The restrictions could include higher barriers for the exceptions
already in place. For example, the law could require that all companies
with more than 500 employees can only claim an exception for highly
compensated employees if the employee is in the top ten percent of
income-earners, rather than the top thirty-five percent. Alternatively, the
law could restrict companies of more than 500 employees from claiming
death benefits for current employees. A number of options could be
explored, but taking account for the size of the company and restricting
the tax benefits for larger companies would erode the ability of
companies to abuse COLI.
Second, the law should require an employee to have worked a
certain length of time before a company could claim death benefits on an
employee. As currently written, an employee could work for a company
for two days and if a life insurance policy were taken out, the company
could still claim death benefits in the case of death so long as the income,
consent, and notice requirements were met. The law should require an
employee to work for a company for a given time period, such as one year.
Imposing a length of time requirement is consistent with the insurable
interest requirement because it is reasonable to require that the employee
work for the company for a certain period of time.
Finally, the law should abolish or limit section 101(j)(2)(A)(i), the
provision that exempts policies for current employees or employees who
worked for the company within twelve months of their death. Companies
should not be able to insure employees and collect tax benefits merely
because the employee currently works for the company. Simply because
an employee works for a company does not establish whether the
company has an insurable interest. If Wal-Mart decides to insure a
minimum-wage employee, the mere fact that the employee died while
working for Wal-Mart does not establish a valid insurable interest. More
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likely, large companies would insure these employees as a way to profit.
At the very least, the statutory provision for claiming employees who
died less than a year after leaving the company should be abolished.
Though this Note has proffered some possible limitations, the precise
time length, income percentage, or company size that would best eliminate
the policy concerns of COLI policies can be determined by Congressional
studies. While many of the time periods and figures proposed here may
seem arbitrary, Congress needs to change the law to eliminate the public
policy consequences associated with COLI. Congressional studies and
fact-finding could help determine what figures and time periods would be
acceptable to amend the law in the fairest way. This Note simply points
out that distinguishing between large and small companies, imposing a
length of time requirement for employees, and abolishing the exceptions
for current employees and employees who worked at a company within a
year of their death are all options that would fix the problems with the
current law. Ultimately, as argued above, abolishing the death benefits
exclusion is a more robust option, but this solution provides a more
realistic, less drastic way for Congress to amend the law.

Conclusion
Life insurance on rank-and-file employees, or Dead Peasant
insurance, abuses COLI. The practice is not consistent with the insurable
interest requirement and amounts to a way for companies to profit off of
employees by gambling on their lives. Courts and legislatures have
already recognized the illegality of STOLI and should analyze COLI in
the same way. States should abolish the ability of employers to insure
employees under their insurable interest statutes.
Congress has already shown itself willing to curb COLI abuse, but
its efforts have been largely ineffective. The 2006 amendments to the
PPA that target COLI do not adequately address the public policy
concerns of COLI and create additional problems that give advantages to
larger companies. Moreover, Dead Peasant policies persist as banks and
other companies have continued to pour billions of dollars into the
profitable enterprise. Congress should abolish the exception in the Code
under section 101(j) which permits an employer to exempt COLI death
benefits from gross income. At the very least, Congress should amend
the law to take account for its flaws by distinguishing between company
size, abolishing the provisions that allows companies to insure current
employees, and imposing a requirement for length of time an employee
must work at a company before being insured.
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